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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAVID J. ORR,

:

Petitioner/Appellant.

Sup. Ct. Case No. 20041057-SC
Ct. Apps. Case No. 20030574-CA

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant, David Orr, appealed from an order extending his probation imposed on
convictions for one count of attempted securitiesfraudand one count of unlicensed brokerdealer, both third degree felonies. The court of appeals affirmed the order. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to its grant of certiorari review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West
2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The order granting certiorari review framed the two issues as follows:
Issue No. 1: Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. Call, 1999 UT 42,
980 P.2d 201 require that a probationer be notified of the State's intent to seek revocation,
modification, or extension of probation prior to the expiration of the existing probation term?

Issue No. 2: Whether the district court made adequate findings, and whether the
district court must find a probation violation is willful to impose an extension of probation?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the court of appeals' decision for
correctness and grant[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35,
If 8, _ P.3d

(citing State v. James, 2000 UT 80, % 8, 13 P.3d 576).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following statutes are reproduced in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (West 2004).1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The charges
Defendant was charged in a February 1999 information with ten counts of securities
fraud, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2000), and nine
counts of unlicensed broker-dealer, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
61-1-3,-21(2000). R2-6.
According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), the charges were based on,
among other things, defendant's material misrepresentations and omissions to investors, his

!

Because defendant was sentenced in May 2000, the applicable code provisions are
those in effect in 2000. Although Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 has been amended since
then, none of the amendments relate to the subsections applicable to this case.
Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, all statutory references will be the West 2004
version of the code.
2

operation of a
Ponzi or pyramid scheme,2 and his soliciting clients to invest in historic railroad bonds,
which, as characterized by the Utah Division of Securities, was an "out and out fraud." PSI
at 2-5.
The guilty pleas
On March 23,2000, defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted securities fraud
and one count of unlicensed broker-dealer, both third degree felonies. R20. In exchange for
the pleas, the State dismissed all remaining charges in this and another case, agreed not to
file any other charges based on defendant's conduct before his pleas, and agreed to
recommend that defendant receive probation with four months jail time. R9.
The sentences
On May 12,2000, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive prison terms
of 0-to-5 years. R22-23. The court suspended the prison terms and placed defendant on 36
months' probation, on the condition that he serve six months in jail. R23. The court also
ordered, as a condition of probation, that defendant pay $ 1850.00 in fines and pay restitution
to his victims. R23. The court directed defendant "to pay no less than $1,000 per month
towards restitution, or 25% of [his] income, under direction of AP&P." R24. Defendant's
probation agreement incorporated the court's restitution order and payment schedule as

2

In a Ponzi or pyramid investment scheme, earlier investors receive returns from
money invested by later investors. See PSI at 3.
3

special conditions of probation. R28-29. After a hearing, the trial court set the total
restitution amount at $355,504.39. Rl 19-21, 170-71.
Progress/Violation Report
On May 9, 2003, three days before defendant's probation was to expire by operation
of law, AP&P filed a progress/violation report stating that the end of defendant's 36-month
probation term was approaching and that although he had so far paid $34,553.20 toward his
fines and restitution, he had not yet paid in full and was, therefore, in violation of his
probation. R228-31; State's Exs. 1, 2. The report, which was supported by an affidavit,
recommended revoking probation and asked that an order to show cause issue.3 Id. The
district court approved the order to show cause on May 12, 2003, and the probation officer
served the order to show cause on defendant seven days later, on May 19,2003. R229,23233;R481:22.
Motion to dismiss
Defendant moved to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of jurisdiction. R234.
Defendant argued that his probation expired by operation of law on May 12, 2003, and that
to continue his probation, AP&P had to both file its report and serve him before that date.
R238-42. Defendant first argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend probation
because violation report was filed after probation expired. R234, 238-41; R481:4, 26.

3

Although the written report recommended revocation of probation and
commitment to prison, it was clear at the subsequent hearing that AP&P had no interest in
revoking probation, but only wanted to extend probation for the purpose of ensuring
defendant's on-going compliance with his restitution payments. R481:36-37.
4

Defendant alternatively argued that due process required that he be served with notice of the
extension proceedings before probation expired. R238-41;R481:4, 24-32. Defendant
reasoned that since he was not served with the violation report until May 19, 2003, seven
days after probation expired, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend probation. Id.
Apparently anticipating that his probation would expire, defendant, on the advice of
counsel, did not make his May and June 2003 restitution payments. R481:30.
After hearing evidence, the trial court specifically found that the violation report was
filed on May 9,2003, three days before probation expired. R388-90;R481:33-34. Relying
on Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11 )(b), the trial court concluded that the filing of the violation
report tolled the running of the probation period. R388-89. The court rejected defendant's
argument that due process required service within the original probation period. R391-92.
The court reasoned that since the running of the probationary period had been tolled by the
filing of the violation report, service of the order to show cause ten days later, on May 19,
2003, was still within the probation period. R391-92; R481:34.
Having found that it had jurisdiction, the trial court extended defendant's probation
for the remaining seven years of his original ten-year sentence (two consecutive 0-5 year
terms). R392-93. The court expressed concern that defendant would not make his restitution
payments unless he continued on formal probation:
The defendant's failure to pay the May and June installments of his restitution
underscores the fact that the defendant is induced to repay his victims only
when he is in the shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held
over him. Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making
restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the Court invokes
5

the full scope of its discretion to extend the defendant's probation for the
maximum length permissible, the remaining full term of his sentence of 10
years.
R393. The trial court then ordered defendant to make up the May and June 2003 restitution
payments he had missed. R481:39. (The trial court's Memorandum Decision is reproduced
in Addendum C).
Defendant timely appealed the order extending his probation to the court of appeals.
R395.
Court of appeals9 opinion
Like the trial court, the court of appeals relied on Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b)
to hold that the timely filing of a violation report tolled the running of the probation period.
See State v. Orr, 2004 UT App 413, If 10, 103 P.3d 164 (attached as Addendum A). The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the violation report in this case was
timely filed. The court of appeals then observed that since the violation report had been filed
before probation had expired, the probation period had been tolled. Thus, the court of
appeals, like the trial court, concluded that the "original term of probation . . . had not yet
expired when [defendant] received notice or when the court entered its extension order." Id.
In footnote 4, however, the court of appeals noted that "in certain circumstances,
application of the tolling provision might implicate the due process concerns expressed in
State v. Call 1999 UT 42, If 11,980 P.2d 201." Id. at \ 10 n.4. But the court of appeals was
unconvinced that "the limited delay between the filing of the AP&P violation report on May
9 and [defendant]'s receipt of notice on May 19 creates such problems." Id.
6

The court of appeals next concluded that the record "adequately reflected] the trial
court's factual determination that [defendant] violated the terms of his probation by failing
to make complete restitution." Id. at If 11. The court of appeals observed that while a finding
of wilful non-compliance was required before probation could be revoked, a finding of
willfulness was unnecessary before probation was merely extended. Id. at fflf 12-14.
Finally, the State conceded, and the court of appeals held, that any extension of
probation was limited to the renewal of the original probationary term of 36 months. Id. at
Tf 15. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's imposition often years'
probation. Id. That issue is not before the Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Due process requires that a probationer be given notice and a hearing before
probation may be revoked or extended. But due process does not require that a probationer
be given notice of revocation or extension proceedings within the original probation term.
Some of this Court's earlier cases held that a trial court retained authority to revoke or extend
probation only if a violation report was filed and the probationer was served within the
original probation term.

All of those cases, however, were based on this Court's

interpretation of the then-applicable probation statutes. None of those cases held that due
process requires notice before expiration of the original probation term. To the extent that
any of those cases could be read to express a due process concern when a defendant is not
served until long after probation expires, that concern is wholly inapplicable to this case,

7

where defendant was given notice of the extension proceeding only a week after probation
was set to expire.
Point II: Although the trial court did not make an express written finding that
defendant violated his probation, the transcript of the extension hearing and the trial court's
written order demonstrates that the court did find that defendant violated his probation by
failing to make complete restitution.
While revoking probation generally requires a finding that defendant wilfully violated
the conditions of his probation, extending probation does not. Extending probation so that
a defendant may fully complete the conditions of his probation is an appropriate alternative
to revoking probation. It does not significantly affect the probationer's liberty, while
allowing the court to ensure that defendant is folly rehabilitated before releasing him
unfettered into society.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A PROBATIONER BE
SERVED WITH NOTICE OF PROBATION EXTENSION
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE ORIGINAL
PROBATION PERIOD
Defendant argues, as he did below, that due process requires that a probationer be
served with notice of revocation or extension proceedings before the original term of
probation expires. Br. Pet. 8-17. Defendant asserts that if a probationer is not given notice
before probation expires, the trial court loses jurisdiction to either revoke or extend

8

probation. Br. Pet. at 9-10. In granting certiorari review, this Court asked that the question
raised by defendant be answered in light of the "due process concerns recited in State v. Call,
1999 UT 42, \ 11, 980 P.2d 201."
In fact, Call does not expressly recite any "due process concern." Indeed, the words
"due process" do not even appear in the Call opinion. Rather, the dicta referred to in
footnote 4 of the court of appeals' opinion, was culled from this Court's prior decisions
which were based, not on a due process analysis, but on whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to revoke or extend probation under the then-applicable version of the probation
statute. As explained below, neither this Court nor the court of appeals has ever held that due
process requires that a probationer be notified of the State's intent to revoke or extend
probation before expiration of the original probation term or that failure to comply with due
process creates a jurisdictional defect that precludes a trial court from extending probation.
And to the extent that Call can be read to raise a due process concern, that concern does not
apply here, where defendant was served with the timely-filed violation report only a week
after probation was set to expire.
A.

Due process requires notice and a hearing before probation may be revoked.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State to "deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Nevertheless, a state "is free to
regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and
fairness, unless in so doing it offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
9

97, 105 (1934); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1934) (due process
protects principles "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"), overruled on other grounds,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Accord Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43
(1996) (rejecting due process challenge to statute providing that defendant's intoxication
could not be considered in determining mental state for crime of murder) (per Scalia, J., with
the chief justice and two other justices concurring, and one justice concurring in the
judgment); Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in the judgment); Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 34 (1991) (rejecting due process challenge to state rule imposing a
burden of production on recidivist challenging validity of prior conviction).
The United States Supreme Court has held that parolees and probationers are entitled
to some due process protections before their parole or probation may be revoked. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,487-89 (1972) (parole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782-86 (1973) (probation). But because parole and probation proceedings are not part
of a criminal prosecution, "the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding
does not apply to parole [or probation] revocations." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. See also
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782. The Supreme Court recognized that it could not "write a code of
procedure" for revocation hearings. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488. Rather, that was "the
responsibility of each State." Id, Thus, the Supreme Court only set forth "the minimum
requirements of due process" in revocation proceedings:
They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
10

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body...; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 488-89. See also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (adopting the above procedural safeguards
in probation revocation proceedings).
In other words, due process requires that before probation may be revoked, a
probationer must first receive written notice of the accusations against him, have an
opportunity to rebut those accusations, and be informed as to the basis for revoking
probation. But the details for providing those minimum procedural safeguards are left for
each individual state to provide by statute.
Defendant here does not claim that he did not receive any of the foregoing due process
rights. Nor could he. He was served with a written notice of the claimed violation of his
probation on May 19, over 30 days before his probation extension hearing was held. R23233-, 386. He was represented by counsel, moved to dismiss the action before the hearing,
and was given a full opportunity to argue his jurisdictional claims and to present any
evidence he had to rebut the allegations. He was also given a written ruling explaining that
his probation was being extended because he had not fully paid his restitution and the trial
court believed that he would not unless he was continued on probation. R386.
Defendant instead claims that his due process rights were violated because he was not
given notice that the State intended to initiate extension proceedings until a week after his
probation would have expired by operation of law. As stated, defendant asserts that this "due

11

process violation" deprived the trial court ofjurisdiction to extend probation. Br. Pet. 9-10,
Defendant's argument rests on his reading of a number of Utah cases, including Call As
shown below, defendant misreads those cases. None adopts the rule urged by defendant.
B.

Due process does not require service before the original probation period
expires.
As a preliminary matter, defendant's argument mixes two distinct concepts: (1)

whether a trial court has jurisdiction to extend probation and (2) whether due process rights
were violated. As explained below, whether a trial court has jurisdiction to extend probation
depends not on due process, but on statute. And, as explained above, whether due process
has been violated depends on whether adopted procedures "offend[] some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental."
Snyder, 29WJS. at 105.
1.

A trial court's authority to extend jurisdiction is controlled by statute, not
due process.

A trial court's power "to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely statutory, and
although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the court's discretion must be exercised
within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788,791 (Utah 1990).
See also State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1988). Thus, whether a trial court has
jurisdiction to revoke or extend probation is determined solely by statute. See id.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) provides that "[probation may be terminated at
any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C
12

misdemeanors or infractions." Under this provision, probation for a felony automatically
terminates at the end of 36 months unless revocation or extension proceedings are initiated
before probation expires. See Green, 757 P.2d at 464-65 (interpreting 1984 version of § 7718-l(10)(a)(i)); State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1315-16 (Utah App. 1991) (same).
But subsection (1 l)(b) provides that "[t]he running of the probation period is tolled
upon the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the
court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b). In other words, if a violation report is filed with
the court before probation expires by law, the probation period is tolled. See State v. Reedy,
937P.2d 152, 153 (Utah App. 1997).
The court of appeals correctly recognized that the timely filing of the violation report
in this case tolled the running of defendant's probation. Defendant's original term of
probation, therefore, "had not yet expired when he received notice or when the court entered
its extension order." Orr, 2004 UT App 413, \ 10. Thus, the court of appeals was correct
when it concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to extend defendant's probation,
even though defendant was served outside the original probation term. Id.
2.

Utah courts have never held that due process requires that a probationer
be served with notice of extension or revocation proceedings before the
original probation term ends.

The question, then, is to whether due process requires a probationer to be served with
notice of extension or revocation proceedings before the original probation term expires. As
explained above, the United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires only
13

that probationers be given written notice of the accusations against them before their
revocation hearings so that they have a fair opportunity to respond. Defendant cites no
authority for his claim that due process also requires that he be given written notice before
expiration of his original probation term. Certainly, none of the Utah cases defendant cites,
including Call, support that claim. A detailed review of those cases helps explain why
neither due process nor Call requires notice of extension or revocation proceedings before
probation expires.
State v. Green. Defendant first cites to State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463-65 (Utah
1988). There, this Court interpreted the 1984 version of section 77-18-1 to require that
probation proceedings be initiated before expiration of the probation period. In so holding,
this Court rejected the State's contention that the then-applicable statutory "eighteen-month
term [was] 'tolled' when any violation occurs within the period and that there is no time limit
for initiating a revocation action." Id. at 464. The Green court observed that the State's
interpretation—that the statute imposed no time limit for initiating a revocation
proceeding—would place defendant "in a perpetual state of limbo" and create an "indefinite
probationary term [that] could theoretically be revoked many years after the original
imposition and suspension of sentence." Id. The State's construction of the statute, the
Court concluded, was contrary to "the plain meaning" of the statute because it would
"obviate the certainty and regularity created by the statute and ignore the plain meaning of
the word 'terminate.'" Id. Green held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke

14

probation because the State had not even filed a violation report before probation expired.
M a t 462,464-65.
The Green opinion does not contain the words "due process." Rather, it was expressly
based on a statutory interpretation of a district court's jurisdictional limitation in extending
or revoking probation. See id. at 464-65. It is true that Green's language about leaving
probationers "in a perpetual state of limbo" is suggestive of a vague due process concern.
But ultimately, that language was only to illustrate that the State's proposed construction of
the statute "would create absurd results." Id. at 464.
Thus, Green stands for nothing more than that under Utah's then-applicable probation
statute, revocation proceedings had to be initiated before expiration of the probation term,
or the trial court would lose jurisdiction over the probationer. The Green court, however,
expressly reserved the question of whether the trial court retains jurisdiction to revoke
probation where the revocation proceedings are initiated, but not completed within the
probation period.4
Smith v. Cook. This Court reached the issue reserved by Green in Smith v. Cook, 803
P.2d 788, 794-95 (Utah 1990). This time, the Court interpreted the 1981 version of section
77-18-1 to require that a defendant also be served with notice of revocation proceedings
before expiration or termination of his probation period, so long as the defendant was not
"actively evading supervision." Although Smith states that its statutory interpretation was

4

The 1984 version of section 77-18-1 did not include the tolling provision that
currently appears in subsection (1 l)(b).
15

in accord with due process concerns, it makes clear that its holding rests not on due process,
but on the construction of the "relevant statutes." Id. at 794-96.
The Smith court framed the issue as "whether probation can be revoked when the
revocation proceeding had been arguably initiated but not completed before the expiration
of a judicially imposed probation period." Id. at 793. The Court first looked at the statutory
language, which at the time stated "that the district courts do not have the authority to extend
a period of probation without a hearing conducted pursuant to the procedures set out in
section 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 1981)." Id. at 794. The Smith court noted that this statutory
"language is consistent with the assertion that without such a hearing, the trial court does not
have the authority to extend the period of supervision beyond the original period of
probation." Id.
The Smith court, however, determined that the statute did not "explicitly deal" with
whether revocation proceedings had to be completed, as opposed to merely initiated, before
the probation term expired. Id. at 794-95. The Court noted that other jurisdictions
addressing the issue "followed one of three approaches: probation may be revoked if
revocation proceedings are (1) initiated within a reasonable time after the probation period,
(2) initiated within the probation period, or (3) completed within the revocation period." Id.
at 794 n.30 (citing Green, 757 P.2d at 465). The Court found cases from other jurisdictions
unhelpful, however, because their rules were "largely... a matter of statutory construction."
M a t 794-95 &n.30,n.33.
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The Smith court ultimately decided that nothing in the 1981 probation statute
"compelled] the conclusion that the revocation proceedings must be completed, as opposed
to initiated, within the probation period." Smith, 803 P.2d at 794. The Court further noted
that "the concerns over the extension of the period of supervision which were relied on in
Green are not implicated in a situation where the revocation proceedings are properly
initiated." Id. The Smith court observed, however, that the 1981 statute placed "a significant
amount of emphasis on the nature and degree of notice to which an individual is entitled prior
to a revocation hearing." The Court concluded that this statutory emphasis on notice evinced
a legislative intent "that a probationer [be] entitled to notice within the period of probation
in order for the court to retain authority to revoke probation." Id. at 795.
But the Smith court also realized that the statutory requirement of notice before
probation ends might be subject to exceptions, "such as where the probationer is actively
avoiding service or is evading the supervision of the probation authorities or when the
violation is committed so close to the termination of probation that it would be impractical
or impossible for the probationer to receive notice within the period of probation." Id. at
795.
In short, the Smith court construed the 1981 statute to mean that a trial court retains
jurisdiction to revoke probation only if the revocation proceedings are initiated before
probation ends. Id. at 794-95. The Court further determined that a revocation proceeding
was not "initiated" within the meaning of the 1981 statute unless the violation report was
filed and the probationer was served. Id.
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The Smith court noted that this statutory construction was consistent with the
underlying rationale in Green. Citing to Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court also noted that its
statutory construction was "in accord with the decisions of this court, as well as the United
States Supreme Court, holding that the guarantees of the fundamental fairness embodied in
the due process clause of the United States Constitution entitle probationers to written notice
of the accusations against them prior to their revocation hearings." Id at 795.
That sentence is the only sentence in Smith to contain the words "due process." It
does not state, however, that due process requires notice of probation revocation or extension
proceedings before the expiration of probation. Rather, it merely repeats the due process
requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon—that probationers are
entitled "to written notice of the accusations against them prior to their revocation
hearings"—and states that this due process requirement is consistent with Smith's
interpretation of the 1981 probation statute. Id. (Emphasis added).
Thus, Smith also does not stand for the proposition that due process requires notice,
in addition to filing a report, during the probation period. It stands only for the proposition
that the 1981 version of the probation statute required service of the order to show cause
before probation expired as a matter of law and that this was consistent with the due process
requirement that probationers receive written notice before a revocation hearing.5
5

Like the 1984 version of the statute addressed in Green, the 1981 version
addressed in Smith also lacked the express tolling provision of current subsection (1 l)(b).
If the 1981 statute had contained subsection (1 l)(b)'s tolling provision, the Smith court's
interpretation would necessarily have been different. See State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 152
(Utah App. 1997) (noting that unlike the statute in Smith, subsection (1 l)(b)'s tolling
18

Court of appeals cases. This Court did not revisit when a trial court retains authority
to revoke or extend probation until nine years, when it issued Call. In the meantime, the
court of appeals did address this issue a number of time. See, e.g., State v. Rowlings, 893
P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 152 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Grate,
947P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997).
Contrary to defendant's claims, none of those cases held that due process required
service before probation ended. Rather, they all relied on the then-applicable statutory
provision to determine whether the trial court had retained jurisdiction to extend probation.
See Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1068-69 (court "must look to applicable statutes to determine
'which stage in the [extension] proceedings must be reached within the period of the
probation for the court to retain its authority over probationers beyond the probation
period"5) (quoting Smith, 803 P.2d at 794) (emphasis and brackets in original); Reedy, 937
P.2d at 153 (construing tolling provision of subsection (11 )(b) to mean that probationer need
not be served before probation ends, so long as violation report is timely filed); Grate, 947
P.2d at 1163-67 (construing 1988 version of the statute, which did not contain tolling
provision of subsection (ll)(b), to hold that probationer must be served within original
probation period).
Although Rawlings contained a discussion on due process, that discussion related not
to whether a defendant must be served before his probation expires, but to what notice and
process a probationer was due before his probation could be extended or revoked. See

provision required only that the violation report be filed before expiration of probation).
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Rowlings, 893 P.2d at 1066-68. The court of appeals concluded that Rawlings' due process
rights were violated in that case because he had only been casually and orally informed about
the accusations against him two days before the extension hearing. Id. at 1069-70. This
conclusion was consistent with the due process requirements set forth in Morrissey and
Gagnon.
In short, the court of appeals concluded, consistent with Green and Smith that the
authority to revoke or extend probation depended on statute, not due process. Its cases also
recognized that due process requires, at a minimum, that a defendant receive sufficient notice
prior to a revocation or extension hearing. See Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1068-69; Grate, 947
P.2d at 1164, 1167; Reedy, 937 P.2d at 152. None of the cases, however, holds that due
process requires notice before probation expires.
State v. Call This Court in State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, 980 P.2d 201, likewise did not
hold that due process requires service before the end of probation, although it does imply in
dicta that Green and Smith imposed such a requirement despite the subsequent enactment of
the tolling provisions in subsection (1 l)(b).
Call was ordered, as a condition of his probation, to complete a sex offender treatment
program. Call, 1999 UT 42, \ 3. Call entered such a program, but could not complete it
before his probation would expire in early April 1995. Id. atffl[2-3. On March 20, 1995,
Call, at the request of his probation officer, executed a "Waiver of Personal Appearance
Before the Court," in which he waived the right to a hearing and agreed to extend his
probation one more year so that he could complete his treatment program. Id. at U 3. AP&P,
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however, did not file the signed waiver and a progress/violation report with the court until
April 5,1995, which was arguably after his probation had expired.6 Id. at ^| 3. The trial court
signed an order extending probation that same day. Id.
Call argued on appeal that "felony probation terminates by [operation of] law after 36
months unless the probation period is tolled or the trial court acts to extend probation during
the probation period." Id. at ^ 8. Citing to subsection (ll)(b), Call argued that because
"AP&P failed to file the progress/violation report or otherwise initiate the extension
proceedings prior to [the expiration date], his probation was not tolled, but terminated as a
matter of law." Id. In other words, Call argued that because the violation report had not
been filed with the trial court before probation expired, the tolling provisions of subsection
(1 l)(b) never kicked in and probation expired as a matter of law.
But the Call court sidestepped the issue of whether the tolling provisions of subsection
(ll)(b) applied in that case. Instead, it decided the case under section 77-18-l(12)(a)(i),
which provides that probation may not be modified or extended'" except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has
violated the conditions of probation.'"/J. at ^f 11 (quoting § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i)) (emphasis in
opinion). This Court essentially held that under subsection (12)(a)(i), a trial court has
jurisdiction to extend probation when a defendant signs a waiver of hearing before expiration

6

The State and the defense disputed whether Call's probation expired on April 3 or
April 8,1992. Id. atffif2 & n.l. Ultimately, this Court's disposition of the case did not
require it to resolve that dispute.
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of the probation period. Call, 1999 UT 42,fflf9-12. Thus, Call like its predecessors, based
its holding not on due process concerns, but on statutory interpretation.
Defendant nevertheless contends that Call held that due process requires notice before
expiration of probation. Br. Pet. 15-16. He gleans this argument from the fact that the Call
court cited to both Green and Smith, and stated,
These cases instruct that if it is the intent of the State to extend the
probationary period beyond its original term, the State must take definitive
action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer must
be given notice of that intent. Otherwise, the probationer is left in a state of
uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his
probation.
Call, 1999UT42,^fll. See also Br. Pet. 15-16. Relying on this statement, defendant asserts
that the Call court "clearly stated that due process requires that the state must take definitive
action to extend the term before the expiration date of the probation and the probationer must
be given notice of that intent." Id. at 16.
Contrary to defendant's argument, Call does not "clearly state" that due process
requires notice before expiration of the probation period. First, the opinion does not even use
the term "due process." Second, the foregoing statement is dicta because it was not
necessary to the court's decision. Third, and most importantly, given subsection (1 l)(b)'s
express tolling provision, CaWs statement is incorrect to the extent that it applies Green and
Smith to today's probation proceedings. As explained, Green and Smith construed earlier
versions of section 77-18-1. Those earlier versions were susceptible to an interpretation that
required both filing and service within the probation period. Subsection 11(b), however, is
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not subject to such a construction. Rather, it expressly provides that the probation period is
tolled upon the timely filing of violation report.
Call's concern that probationers would otherwise be "left in a state of uncertainty, not
knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of probation" echoed the concern
expressed in Green—that failure to initiate revocation proceedings before probation expired
could leave a probationer "in a perpetual state of limbo." Green, 757 P.2d at 464. But, as
stated, Green's concern that probation could be continued indefinitely without a defendant's
knowledge was not predicated on a due process concern. Rather, it was in response to the
State's argument in that case that there was no statutory time limit on when the State could
initiate revocation proceedings. Id. To adopt that construction of the probation statute, this
Court said, "would create absurd results" because "although [defendant's] probation would
appear to have been terminated, usually by entry of an order to that effect, defendants would
actually be subject to a continued term of fictional supervision." Id.
Nothing in those statement suggest that the Green court believed that due process
required that a probationer always be served before probation expired. To the contrary, the
Green court was more concerned that imposing no limitations period might result in a
defendant obtaining an order terminating probation and then discovering much later that
probation had been revoked. Id.
In short, the holdings in both Green and Smith were based on the interpretation of the
statutes in effect at that time. Neither case rested on due process concerns. Accordingly,
Cair s dicta repeating their holdings did not directly express any due process requirement that
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a probationer be notified of revocation or extension proceedings before probation expires.
But, as explained below, to the extent that Green, Smith, and Call could be read to express
a due process concern, that concern has no application to this case.
C.

Defendant has not shown how serving him a week after probation was set to
expire violated any due process rights.
Other than the foregoing cases, defendant cites no authority and advances no

reasoning for the proposition that due process requires that he also be served with notice of
the extension proceedings before expiration of the original probation term. As explained,
none of those cases supports his claim. Moreover, the State has searched for and found no
case from any other jurisdiction that supports this claim. Indeed, the only case to directly
address the claim, rejected it. See People v. Ritter, 464 N. W.2d 919,923 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991) ("We are not persuaded that due process requires that the defendant be served with
notice of the probation revocation proceedings within the period of probation. . . . Due
process requires only that the defendant receive notice reasonably calculated to apprise him
of the charges and an opportunity for a hearing.").
The court of appeals, however, apparently read Call as, at least obliquely, expressing
a due process concern: "We note, that in certain circumstances, application of the tolling
provision, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (2003), might implicate the due process
concerns expressed in State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, If 11, 980 P.2d 201." Orr, 2004 UT App
413, f 10, n.4. That footnote, which is the basis for the first question framed by this Court,
quoted the concern expressed in Green—that the probationer not "be left in a state of
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uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his probation." Id.
(quoting Call, 1999 UT 42, \ 11).
It is conceivable that the tolling provision might, in some extraordinary circumstance,
result in a due process violation. For example, if a violation report were filed before the end
of the probation period, but not served until several years later, a probationer could argue that
he believed he was free from probation and that the delayed service denied him notice that
he was required to continue to comply with the conditions of his probation. A probationer
might claim that under those circumstances, fundamental fairness required that his probation
be terminated. Of course, that claim would have force only if the defendant had not
absconded or was not avoiding service and the delay in service was due to lack of diligence
on the part of the State. See Smith, 803 P.2d at 795 (suggesting that service before end of
probationary period might not be required where probationer is actively avoiding service or
evading supervision or where violation is committed so close to termination that it would be
impractical or impossible for the probationer to receive notice within the probation period);
see also People v. Ritter, 464 N.W.2d 919, 922-23 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing
that due process does not require that the defendant be served within probation period,
particularly where he has absconded).
But that concern, however legitimate in a different context, has no application here.
As the court of appeals noted, there is no reason to think that "the limited delay between the
filing of the AP&P violation report on May 9 and [his] receipt of notice on May 19 create[d]"
any due process concerns. Although the probation officer may have told defendant that he
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would recommend termination of probation, see R481:22-23, defendant had no promise that
the court would grant that request. Also, defendant knew within a week after probation was
set to expire what the final recommendation would be.
Defendant has not explained how this short delay denied him any procedural right or
fundamental fairness. Furthermore, he does not contend that he received inadequate notice
of the extension hearing. Nor does defendant claim to have been left in "a perpetual state of
limbo." Green, 757 P.2d at 464. In fact, he cites no unfairness in the process whatever.
Rather, he makes a technical argument whose character is completely unrelated to
fundamental fairness, the lone concern of the due process guarantee.7
In short, the court of appeals was rightly "unconvinced that the limited delay between
the filing of the AP&P violation report on May 9 and [defendant's receipt of notice on May
19 createfd]" any due process concerns. Orr, 2004 UT App 413 n.4.

7

Although not articulated as such, defendant's argument appears to be, in effect, a
facial due process challenge to the statutory tolling provision in subsection (1 l)(b).
Defendant, however, does not have standing to raise a due process facial challenge to the
statute. He can only attack the challenge as applied to him. See State v. Green, 2004 UT
76, \ 44, 99 P.3d 820; State v. McGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 12, 84 P.3d 1171. As explained,
defendant has not alleged, much less shown, how this short delay violated his due process
rights.
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POINT II
A COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO EXTEND PROBATION UPON A
FINDING THAT THE PROBATIONER HAS NOT COMPLETED THE
TERMS OF HIS PROBATION, INCLUDING A FAILURE TO FULLY
PAY COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION
Defendant argues, as he did in the court of appeals, that the trial court could not
extend his probation without first finding that he had willfully violated his probation. Br.
Pet. 18. Defendant first contends that the trial court "entered no finding that the conditions
of probation had been violated." Br. Pet. 18 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Defendant second contends that the trial court made no finding that any violation
was wilful.
As explained below, the court of appeals properly held that although the trial court did
not make an express written finding that defendant violated his probation, the record
demonstrates that the trial court did find that defendant violated his probation by failing to
make complete restitution. Orr, 2004 UT App 431, ^} 11. The court of appeals also correctly
held that although wilfulness is generally a prerequisite to revoking probation, it is not a
prerequisite for merely extending probation.
A.

The record in this case reflects that the trial court found that defendant violated
the conditions of his probation by failing to make full restitution.
Defendant is correct that "[probation may not be modified or extended except upon

waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i).
Section 77-18-1(12)(e)(i) provides that "[a]fter the hearing, the court shall make findings of
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fact." Once the trial court finds "that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the
court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii).
Although the probation statute requires factual findings, it does not specify that the
findings be written. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(i). Indeed, both this Court and
the court of appeetls have held that written findings of fact are not necessary in every
probation revocation proceeding, so long as the trial court record and transcript adequately
reflect "the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation

" State v. Hodges,

798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990). See also Morishita v. Morris, 621 P.2d 691, 692-93
& n.2 (Utah 1980) {Morishita I); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998) (noting
that while trial court had not made express finding that jury was not prejudiced, it had
implicitly made that finding); State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284 (although
written findings by court were absent from record, oral findings were sufficiently clear so as
to allow appellate court to determine basis of trial court's decision). This is because "[t]he
chief purpose of findings of fact, whether separately written or found in a transcript, is to
enable a reviewing court to accurately determine the basis for the trial court's decision."
Hodges, 798 P.2d at 274 (citing Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983)
{Morishita II) (written findings constitutionally required only if transcript and record do not
enable a reviewing court to determine basis of decision)). Thus, so long as the record
provides a sufficient basis for reviewing the reasons for the trial court's decision, written
findings are not required.
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Here, the court of appeals determined that the record "adequately reflected] the trial
court's factual determination that [defendant] violated the terms of his probation by failing
to make complete restitution." O r , 2004 UT App 413, f 11. In support, the court of appeals
noted that it was "undisputed that Orr had been ordered to pay over $350,000 in restitution
and had actually paid approximately $35,000." Id. The court of appeals also observed that
the hearing transcript and the trial court's written order were "replete with statements from
the trial court indicating the court's acceptance of this factual basis." Id. For example, the
trial court noted during the hearing that defendant "hasn't paid a nickel on his restitution
since he thought probation was over." Id.; R481:37, 39. The written order elaborated:
The defendant's failure to pay the May and June installments of his restitution
underscores the fact that defendant is induced to repay his victims only when
he is in the shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over
him. Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making restitution
payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the Court invokes the full
scope of its discretion to extend the defendant's probation . . .
R393.
Thus, based on the record and the trial court's written order, there is no question that
the trial court found that defendant had violated his probation because he had not completed
one of the conditions of his probation: payment of restitution to his victims. See Orr, 2004
UTApp413,Tfll.
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B.

"Wilful" violation is not a prerequisite to extending probation; rather it is
enough to show that defendant has not completed all the conditions of probation.
The question, then, is whether a finding that a defendant has not fully paid his

restitution, even though that failure may not have been willful, constitutes a "violation" for
the purpose of extending probation.
The Supreme Court held in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,661-62 (1983), that in
order to revoke probation for failure to make money payments—such as for restitution and
fines— the sentencing court must either find that probationer was at fault or that alternatives
other than imprisonment are inadequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and
deterrence. Bearden pled to guilty to burglary and theft. Id. at 662. Bearden was given
probation on the condition that he pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. Id. Bearden was
to pay $100 the day of sentencing, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance within four
months. Id. Bearden borrowed the first $200 payments from his parents. Id. He was unable
to pay the balance within the allotted time, however, because he had been laid off rom his job
and was unable to find a new one. Id. at 662-63. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
revoked Bearden's probation for his failure to pay the balance of his fine and restitution. Id.
at 663.
The Bearden court held that "if the State determines a fine or restitution to be the
appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely
because he lacked the resources to pay it." Id. at 667-68. The Supreme Court, however, also
held that if "the probation has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the
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means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce
collection." Id. at 668. The Court recognized that "a probationer's failure to make sufficient
bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution
may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to society for his crime," and
that this, too, would justify revoking probation. Id.
The point of Bearden was that if a probationer had made all reasonable efforts to pay
restitution, but could not do so through no fault of his own, it would be "fundamentally unfair
to revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods
of punishing the defendant are available." Id. at 668-69 (emphasis added). The Bearden
court further explained that an alternative means of enforcing a restitution order would be
to "extend the time for making payments, or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer
perform some form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine." Id. at 671-72.
The Utah Court of Appeals applied Bearden's reasoning in a non-monetary probation
case to hold that "as a general rule, in order to revoke probation for the violation of a
condition of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful or,
if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,
276 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added). The defendant in Hodges had his probation
revoked because he was not making sufficient progress in his sex offender treatment
program. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 271-73. The court of appeals reversed the revocation because
it determined that Hodges had never been notified that his probation would be revoked if he
did not "make progress at a certain rate, regardless of fault." Id. at 277-78.
31

The Hodges court, however, recognized that "fault is not necessary in every instance
of probation revocation." Id. at 276. Relying on Bearden, the court of appeals explained that
"a finding of fault would not necessarily be required in probation revocation proceedings not
involving the failure to pay a fine." Id. at 276-77. For example, in the case of "chronic
drunken driving... 'it may indeed be reckless' to continue probation for someone unable to
control a problem, thereby posing a threat to the safety or welfare of society." Id. (quoting
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668 n.9). Thus, the court of appeals concluded that probation could not
be revoked for a non-wilful violation unless "it [was] also found that, because of this failure,
appellant poses a present danger to others." Id at 277.
Defendant relies heavily on Hodges to support his claim that probation may be
extended only if a probationer wilfully violates his probation. Br. Pet. But neither Hodges
nor Bearden support that proposition. Both cases stand for the proposition that a defendant's
probation may not be revoked and a defendant incarcerated unless-failure to pay restitution
is wilful. Neither case suggests that a non-wilful failure to pay restitution cannot be dealt
with by extending probation to give the defendant more time to pay restitution. To the
contrary, both cases clearly contemplate that extension of probation is an appropriate
"alternative method" for dealing with a non-wilful failure to fully comply with the terms of
probation. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69 (holding that appropriate alternative to
revocation is to "extend the time for making payments"); Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 ("in order
to revoke probation for failure to make money payments, the sentencing court must either
find that probationer was at fault or that alternatives other than imprisonment are inadequate
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to meet the state's interests in punishment and deterrence") (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at
672)).
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals in this case correctly drew the important
distinction between revocation and extension proceedings: "Probation revocation necessarily
involves the loss of a significantly greater interest—the probationer's liberty—than does the
mere extension of probationary status." Orr, 2004 UT App 413, f 12.
But defendant's argument is wrong for a more fundamental reason.

Under

defendant's theory, a trial court could never extend probation for a non-wilful violation, even
though the defendant has not fully complied with the conditions of his probation. This would
subvert the rehabilitative purposes of granting probation. See State v. Allendinger, 565 P.2d
1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) (holding that obvious intent of probation statute is "to permit the
court to rehabilitate an erring criminal and to make a useful citizen out of him"). For
example, a defendant, ordered to complete sex offender treatment as a condition of probation,
may not be able to complete the program within the probation period through no fault of his
own. Under defendant's analysis, this would not be a "violation" of probation and the trial
court would therefore lack authority to extend probation to ensure that the defendant is fully
rehabilitated before being released unfettered into society. This result directly contradicts
the holding in Hodges—that a non-wilful violation may result in revocation if because of the
violation the probationer "presently threaten[s] the safety of society." Hodges, 798 P.2d at

33

277. If fault is not always required to revoke probation, it certainly cannot and should not
be a prerequisite to extend probation.8
In sum, defendant's non-wilful failure to fully pay restitution constituted a violation
for purposes ofextending his probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii). Because
that fact was not disputed below, the trial court had authority to extend defendant's
probation.9

8

Holding that a trial court could not extend probation without a finding of a
wilfulness would substantially affect current practice in the trial courts, where it is not
uncommon to extend probation so as to allow a defendant to complete the conditions of
his or her probation. See, e.g., State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, f 5, 980 P.2d 201; State v.
Rowlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Utah App. 1995).
9

Even if this Court were to rule that the trial court improperly extended defendant's
formal probation, the trial court may retain bench probation over defendant until he fully
pays his restitution. Section 77-18-1(1 )(a)(ii)(A) provides, "If, upon expiration or
termination of the probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid
balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may
retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable." Defendant
conceded in the court of appeals that this provision permits the trial court to continue
bench probation no matter how long it takes for him to pay restitution. Thus, should this
Court determine that formal probation was improperly extended in this case, it should
nevertheless rematnd for the trial court to place defendant on bench probation, as it was
the trial court's clear intent to exercise jurisdiction over defendant as long as necessary to
ensure full payment of restitution.
It should also be noted that there appears to be little practical difference between
continuing defendant on formal probation and placing him on bench probation for the
purpose of enforcing restitution. Either way, if defendant wilfully fails to pay his
restitution, the trial court can incarcerate him. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1(4)
(2003) (providing that if defendant fails to make a "good faith effort" to make payments,
the court may find defendant in contempt and "order the defendant committed until the
criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified part of it, is paid"). Also, under both
formal and bench probation, the trial court may order AP&P to continue to collect
restitution from defendant at the payment schedule set by the court and to notify the court
should defendant default on any of his payments. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(9)(b)
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks the Court to affirm the court of
appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 5 ^ day of
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MARKL. SHURTLEFF
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MJRAB.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

(Department of Corrections to collect restitution during "probation period in cases for
which court orders supervised probation and any extension of that period by the
department in accordance with Subsection (10)"). See, e.g, State v. Nones, 2000 UT App
211, ^f 3 (trial court retained bench probation for collection of restitution, but ordered
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Jay ORR, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030574-CA.
Nov. 12,2004.
Background:
State
defendant's probation
violations. TTie Third
Department, Timothy
probation, and defendant

petitioned
to
revoke
for fraud and securities
District Court, Salt Lake
R. Hanson, J., extended
appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held
that:
(1) trial court had jurisdiction to extend
defendant's probation;
(2) evidence was sufficient to support extension of
probation; and
(3) trial court could not extend probation for
renewal period that exceeded original probation
term.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Sentencing and Punishment €^1947
350HM947 Most Cited Cases
[1] Sentencing and Punishment ^^1951
350Hkl951 Most Cited Cases
Evidence that Probation and Parole filed petition to
revoke probation prior to expiration of probation
period tolled running of probation period, and thus,
trial court had jurisdiction to extend defendant's
probation for fraud and securities violations. West's
U.C.A. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b).
[2] Sentencing and Punishment €^1951
350Hkl951 Most Cited Cases
Trial court's order extending defendant's probation

for fraud and securities violations was supported by
findings that defendant had paid approximately
$35,000 of $350,000 restitution order, and that
defendant's only incentive to pay restitution was
threat of incarceration. West's U.C.A. § 77-18-1(12)

[3] Sentencing and Punishment €=>2003
350Hk2003 Most Cited Cases
Absent a finding of willfulness or fault on the part
of the probationer, revocation of probation is
appropriate only if a violation is found to presently
threaten the safety of society, or, in the case of
failure to make payments of money, if other
alternatives to imprisonment are found to be
inadequate to meet the State's interests in
punishment and deterrence. West's U.C.A. §
77-18-1(12).
[4] Sentencing and Punishment €=>1952
350Hkl952 Most Cited Cases
Trial court could not extend defendant's probation
for fraud and securities violations for renewal
period that exceeded original probation term of
three years. West's U.C.A. § 77-18-1.
[5] Sentencing and Punishment €=>1952
350Hkl952 Most Cited Cases
Any extension of probation is limited to a renewal
of the original probationary term. West's U.C.A. §
78-18-l(12)(e)(ii).
*164 Larry R. Keller, Cohne Rappaport & Segal,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
*165 Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and
Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges JACKSON, ORME, and THORNE.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
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**1 David Jay On appeals the trial court's
extension of his probation. Orr argues that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction due to the expiration of his
original probation period. We affirm all aspects of
the trial court's decision except for the length of the
extension of Orr's probation.
BACKGROUND
**2 Orr pleaded guilty to two third degree felonies
in connection with alleged fraud and securities
violations. On May 12, 2000, the trial court
sentenced Orr to two consecutive prison terms of
zero-to-five years. The court suspended all but six
months of the prison time and placed Orr on
thirty-six months probation under the supervision of
the Utah Adult Probation and Parole Department
(AP & P). The court also ordered Orr to pay
$355,504.39 in restitution, with directions that Orr
was "to pay no less than $1,000 per month towards
restitution, or 25% of [his] income, under direction
ofAP&P."
**3 During his probation, Orr made thirty-four
monthly payments of approximately $1080. In May
2003, shortly before Orr's probation period was due
to expire, AP & P filed a probation violation report
stating that Orr had paid only $34,553.20 in
restitution. AP & P characterized this as a
probation violation and asked the court to order Orr
to show cause as to why his probation should not be
revoked. The date stamp on the report reflected a
filing date of May 9, 2003. The court issued an
order to show cause on May 13, and the order was
served on Orr on May 19.
**4 Orr moved to dismiss the order to show cause
for lack of jurisdiction. Orr argued that his
probation expired by operation of law on May 12,
and that to continue his probation AP & P needed 1o
file its report and seive him with notice before that
date. Based upon a handwritten adjustment to the
date stamp on the violation report, Orr argued that
the report had been filed one day late, on May 13.
Orr also argued that he had not been served with
notice of the alleged violation until May 19. Orr
failed to make restitution payments in either May or
June 2003.

**5 On June 23, 2003, the trial court held a
hearing to consider Orr's motion to dismiss. AP &
P agent Robert Egelund testified that he had filed
the report on May 9, 2003. The trial court, relying
on Egelund's testimony as well as the date stamp on
the report, found that the report was filed on May 9,
three days before the expiration of Orr's probation.
The court ruled that the timely filing of the report
tolled Orr's probationary period pursuant to Utah
Code section 77-18-1(11), [FN1] and that this
tolling provided the court with jurisdiction to
extend Orr's probation despite the May 19 service
on Orr. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (2003).
FN1. The trial court did not specify which
version of Utah Code section 77-18-1 it
relied on. For purposes of this matter,
section 77- 18-1 has not substantively
changed since prior to Orr's sentencing,
and we will cite to the current version for
convenience.
**6 The trial court then extended Orr's probation
for the full ten-year term of Orr's suspended prison
sentences.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
**7 Orr challenges the trial court's extension of his
probation pursuant to Utah Code section 77-18-1.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003). "Because
the interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law, we review whether the trial court
had jurisdiction to extend defendant's probation for
correctness." State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, |
7, 976 P.2d 1224. Factual findings made by the
trial court are "reversed only if clearly erroneous."
State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, % 9, 79 P.3d 937
(quotations and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court had Jurisdiction to Extend Orr's
Probation
[1] **8 Orr argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to extend his probation *166 because
one or more necessary events [FN2] did not occur
prior to the expiration of his original probation term
on May 12, 2003. [FN3] The trial court determined
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that AP & P filed its violation report on May 9 and
that this filing tolled the running of Orr's probation.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (2003).
Accordingly, the trial court found that it had
jurisdiction to extend Orr's probation.
FN2. These events included AP & P's
filing of the violation report, the court's
issuance of an order to show cause, and the
receipt of notice by Orr.
FN3. The parties dispute whether Orr's
probation term was originally scheduled to
expire on May 12 or May 13. Because we
conclude that the running of Orr's
probation period was tolled on May 9, we
do not reach this issue.
**9 Orr argues that AP & P's probation violation
report was filed on May 13, rather than May 9 as
found by the trial court. "A trial court's factual
findings will not be reversed absent clear error."
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 60, 28 P.3d 1278
To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly
erroneous, the defendant "must first marshal all
the evidence that supports the trial court's
findings. After marshaling the supportive
evidence, the appellant then must show that, even
when viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence
is insufficient to support the trial court's
findings."
Id. (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 17
n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108) (emphases omitted). Viewing
the trial court's decision in the most favorable light,
we conclude that it is supported both by the date
stamp on the document and by the testimony of AP
& P agent Egelund-testimony that the trial court
specifically found to be "credible." We affirm the
trial court's factual determination that AP & P filed
its violation report on May 9.
**10 "The running of the probation period is
tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the
court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an
order to show cause or warrant by the court." Utah

Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (2003) (emphases
added). Accordingly, the trial court properly found
that the May 9 filing of the violation report tolled
the expiration of Orr's probation. Orr's original
term of probation therefore had not yet expired
when he received notice or when the court entered
its extension order, and the court had jurisdiction to
extend Orr's probation. [FN4]
FN4.
We
note
that,
in
certain
circumstances, application of the tolling
provision, see Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1(1 l)(b) (2003), might implicate the
due process concerns expressed in State v.
Call, 1999 UT 42, \ 11, 980 P.2d 201
("[I]f it is the intent of the State to extend
the probationary period beyond its original
term, the State must take definitive action
to extend the term before the expiration
date, and the probationer must be given
notice of that intent. Otherwise, the
probationer is left in a state of uncertainty,
not knowing whether to continue to
observe the terms of his probation."). We
are not convinced that the limited delay
between the filing of the AP & P violation
report on May 9 and Orr's receipt of notice
on May 19 creates such problems.
II. The Extension of Orr's Probation Had a
Sufficient Factual Basis
[2] **11 Orr next argues that the trial court had no
authority to extend his probation because it did not
make a specific factual finding that he willfully
violated his probation terms. By statute,
"[probation may not be modified or extended
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer
or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions oj
probation:' Utah Code Ann. § 77-18- l(12)(a)(I)
(2003) (emphases added). The record before this
court adequately reflects the trial court's factual
determination that Orr violated the terms of his
probation by failing to make complete restitution. It
was undisputed that Orr had been ordered to pay
over $350,000 in restitution and had actually paid
approximately $35,000. The record of Orr's
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hearing is replete with statements from the trial
court indicating the court's acceptance of this
factual basis, as is the court's written order. [FN5]
*167 We conclude that the trial court properly
found that Orr had violated the conditions of his
probation by failing to complete the required
restitution.
FN5. At Orr's hearing, the trial court
observed that "[Orr] hasn't paid a nickel on
his restitution since he thought probation
was over." Additionally, the court's July 2,
2003 order stated:
[Orr's] failure to pay the May and June
installments of his restitution underscores
the fact that [Orr] is induced to repay his
victims only when he is in the shadow of
probation and the threat of incarceration is
held over him. [Orr's] only incentive to
continue making restitution payments is to
avoid his probation being revoked...."
These statements reveal an implicit but
clear finding that Orr had not paid the
entire restitution amount ordered as a
condition of his probation. See State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998)
(upholding trial court's decision based on
implicit factual finding regarding jury
prejudice).
[3] **12 Orr argues that even if he did fail to
comply with the probation terms, extension of his
probation was improper because the trial court
made no finding that his probation violation was
willful. Willfulness is not an express statutory
requirement for either extension or revocation of
probation under section 77-18-1(12). However, this
court has stated that "to revoke probation, a
violation of a probation condition must, as a general
rule, be willful." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,
276 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Absent a finding of
willfulness or fault on the part of the probationer,
revocation of probation is appropriate only if a
violation is found to "presently threaten the safety
of society," id. at 277, or, in the case of failure to
make payments of money, if other alternatives to
imprisonment are found to be inadequate to meet
the State's interests in punishment and deterrence.

See id. at 276; see also Bear den v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 671-72, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221
(1983) (holding that to revoke probation for failure
to make money payments the sentencing court must
either find that the probationer was at fault or that
other alternatives to imprisonment are inadequate).
**13 Probation revocation necessarily involves the
loss of a significantly greater interest-the
probationer's liberty-than does the mere extension
of probationary status. Indeed, the value of the
right to personal liberty appears to have been the
underlying basis of the Hodges decision:
"The right to personal liberty may be as valuable
to one convicted of a crime as to one not so
convicted, and so long as one complies with the
conditions upon which such right is assured by
judicial declaration, he may not be deprived of
the same. Such right may not be alternatively
granted and denied without just cause."
Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (quoting State v.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 1046 (1927)
). Nevertheless, to the extent that the requirements
of Hodges can be applied to the extension of
probation, we conclude that the trial court fulfilled
those requirements.
**14 The trial court's extension order stated that
"[Orr] is induced to repay his victims only when he
is in the shadow of probation and the threat of
incarceration is held over him" and that "[Orr's]
only incentive to continue making restitution
payments is to avoid his probation being revoked."
These statements constitute clear findings that
"alternatives other than [the extension of Orr's
probation] are inadequate to meet the state's interest
in punishment and deterrence." Id. No further
finding of "just cause" is required. Id.
III. Probation May Be Extended Only
Increments of the Original Probation Term

in

[4][5] **15 Orr argues, and the State concedes,
that any extension of probation is limited to a
renewal of the original probationary term. We
agree. "Upon a finding that the defendant violated
the conditions of probation, the court may order the
probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the
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entire probation term commence anew." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-18- l(12)(e)(ii) (2003) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the trial court's extension of
Orr's probation for ten years, the combined length
of his suspended prison terms, was error. The
extension of Orr's probation on this occasion should
not have exceeded his original probation period of
three years.
CONCLUSION
**16 We conclude that the trial court properly
exercised its jurisdiction over Orr when it extended
his probation. The trial court erred, however, by
extending Orr's probation for a period of time
greater than that allowed by Utah Code section
77-18-1. We reverse *168 and remand this matter
with directions that the trial court amend Orr's
probation order in a manner consistent with this
opinion.
**17 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON
and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges.
103 P.3d 164, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 2004 UT
App 413
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM B
Statutes

§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—ProbationSupervision—Presentence
investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of
a
ny crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court
may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private
organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court,
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards
shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level
of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other
criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
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(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing.
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be
waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the
defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
and
(x) comnlv with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
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(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance
with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of
State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of
court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
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toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the
hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant
by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 1o constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes ptrobable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a timfe and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance,
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for
him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
\
(iii) The persons who haive given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
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(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the
state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the
subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime
including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the
victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections
76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to
the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the
court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
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(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section,
it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of
the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be
indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this
section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47,
§ 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c.
212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1;
Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c.
14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws
1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995;
Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1995,
1997,
1999,
2001,
2002,
2003,

c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995, Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws
c. 390, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws
c. 279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws
c. 137, § 1, eff. Apnl 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws
5th Sp. Sess., c. 8, § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5,

§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 . 1 . Collection of criminal judgment accounts receivable
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Criminal judgment accounts receivable" means any amount due the
state arising from a criminal judgment for which payment has not been
received by the state agency that is servicing the debt.
\
(b) "Accounts receivable" includes unpaid fees, overpayments, fines, forfeitures, surcharges, costs, interest, penalties, restitution to victims, third party
claims, claims, reimbursement of a reward, and damages.
(2)(a) A criminal judgment account receivable ordered by the court as a
result of prosecution for a criminal offense may be collected by any means
authorized by law for the collection of a civil judgment.
(b)(i) The court may permit a defendant to pay a criminal judgment
account receivable in installments.
(ii) In the district court, if the criminal judgment account receivable is
paid in installments, the total amount due shall include all fines, surcharges, postjudgment interest, and fees.
(c) Upon default in the payment of a criminal judgment" account receivable
or upon default in the payment of any installment of that receivable, the
criminal judgment account receivable may be collected as provided in this
section or Subsection 77-18-1(9) or (10), and by any means authorized by
law for the collection of a civil judgment.
(3) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a criminal judgment
account receivable or any installment of that receivable, the court, on motion of
the prosecution, victim, or upon its own motion may:
(a) order the defendant to appear and show cause why the default should
not be treated as contempt of court; or
(b) issue a warrant of arrest.
(4)(a) Unless the defendant shows that the default was not attributable to an
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure to make a good
faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that the default constitutes
contempt.
(b) Upon a finding of contempt, the court may order the defendant committed until the criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified part of
it, is paid.
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(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default is not
contempt, the court may enter an order for any of the following or any
combination of the following:
(a) require the defendant to pay the criminal judgment account receivable
or a specified part of it by a date certain;
(b) restructure the payment schedule;
(c) restructure the installment amount;
(d) except as provided in Section 77-18-8, execute the original sentence of
imprisonment;
(e) start the period of probation anew;
(f) except as limited by Subsection (6), convert the criminal judgment
account receivable or any part of it to community service;
(g) except as limited by Subsection (6), reduce or revoke the unpaid
amount of the criminal judgment account receivable; or
(h) in the district court, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility
for collecting the judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(6) In issuing an order under this section, the court may not modify the
amount of the judgment of complete restitution.
(7) Whether or not a default constitutes contempt, the court may add to the
amount owed the fees established under Subsection 63A-8-201(4)(g) and postjudgment interest.
(8)(a)(i) If a criminal judgment account receivable is past due in a case
supervised by the Department of Corrections, the judge shall determine whether or not to record the unpaid bcilance of the account receivable as a civil
judgment.
(ii) If the judge records the unpaid balance of the account receivable as a
civil judgment, the judge shall transfer the responsibility for collecting the
judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(b) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by
the Department of Corrections is past due, the district court may, without a
motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judgment
account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility for
collecting the account receivable to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(c) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by
the Department of Corrections is more than 90 days past due, the district
court shall, without a motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the
criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the
responsibility for collecting the criminal judgment account receivable to the
Office of State Debt Collection.
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(9)(a) When a fine, forfeiture, surcharge, cost permitted by statute, fee, or an
order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association,
the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation
or association shall pay the obligation from those assets.
(b) Failure to pay the obligation may be held to be contempt under
Subsection (3).
(10) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in behalf of a victim.
Laws 1979, c. 69, § 2; Laws 1983, c. 262, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 2; Laws 1999, c.
279, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 135, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 278,
§ 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2002, c. 135, modified a statute reference in subsec. (7).

Laws 2003, c. 278, inserted in subsec. (l)(b)
"reimbursement of a reward".

ADDENDUM C
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision

Third Judicial Dtstnci

JUL - Z 2003
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By.

•

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

CASE NO. 001902772

:

DAVID JAY ORR,
Defendant.

:

This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 23,
2003, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to
Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction.

The State elicited testimony

from Robert Egelund, the defendant's AP&P

officer. The Court

received into evidence two exhibits, consisting of Mr. Egelund's
copies of the Progress/Violation Report

and the Affidavit

in

Support of the Order to Show Cause (both of which were originally
filed with the Court).
Following Mr. Egelund's testimony and oral argument from the
prosecution and counsel for the defendant, the Court ruled from the
bench that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied and that he
was to make up the May and June restitution payments.
took

under

advisement

the

issue

of

whether

the

The Court
defendant's

probation may be extended to the limit or term of the original
sentence. The Court also indicated to counsel that a more thorough
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discussion of the Court's legal basis for denying the Motion to
Dismiss would be included in the Memorandum Decision that the Court
would issue.

Having now again reviewed the defendant's Motion to

Dismiss (the State did not file a-jresponse) and having considered
counsel's arguments and Mr. Egelund's testimony, the Court rules as
stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In his Motion to Dismiss, the defendant contends that this
Court

lacks

proceedings

the jurisdiction
against

him

to

because

initiate probation

extension

these

were

proceedings

not

initiated until after probation had already terminated by operation
of

law.

The

defendant's

argument

is based

on

an

erroneous

presumption that his probation terminated on May 12, 2003, and that
the proceedings were not formally commenced until May 13, 2 0 03,
when he considers the Progess/Violation Report to have been filed.
The legal analysis of whether this Court has the jurisdiction
to extend the defendant's probation begins with an analysis of when
the extension proceedings were initiated in this case and when the
defendant's probation would have terminated.

As an aside, the

Court notes that the defendant takes issue with whether this Court
is even permitted to consider an extension of his probation given
that the filing of a Progress/Violation Report implies a potential
revocation proceeding and possible incarceration. According to the
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defendant, such a Report is an inappropriate vehicle for seeking an
extension of his probation, even if it had been timely filed.
The Court concludes that the styling
unimportant

given

that

the

Court

has

a

of the report is
wide

latitude

and

flexibility in determining whether probation should be revoked or
modified (including the possibility of extending the probationary
term).

Because it is the Court and not AP&P that fashions, these

remedies, how AP&P chooses to style the reports that it files with
the Court has no import in the Court's ultimate determination of
the appropriate remedy.

In this case, the Court opfcs for extending

the defendant's probation, as opposed to.revoking it altogether.
Therefore, the Court will refer to these proceedings as a probation
extension proceeding. Having addressed the defendant's argument on
this point, the Court proceeds to analyze the timing of the filings
that initiated this probation extension proceeding.
Under Utah Code Annotated §77-18-1(11) (b) , n[t]he running of
the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation
report with

the court alleging

a violation of the terms and

conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show
cause or warrant by the court."

The first issue therefore becomes

when the Progress/Violation Report was filed and whether it tolled
the running of the defendant's probation period under §77-181(11) (b) .
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Progress/Violation

Report

established by the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund.

was

Mr. Egelund

testified that he met with the undersigned on May 9, 2 003, and
pursuant to that meeting, he returned to the Court on the same date
for the purpose of filing the Progress/Violation Report and the
Affidavit

in

Support

of

Order

to

Show

Cause.

Mr.

Egelund

specifically testified that on May 9, 2003, He brought copies of
these documents to the Court, date-stamped them and left them in
the intake basket for the Court's clerk.

Ih support of this

testimony, Mr. Egelund offered his copies of the Progress/Violation
Report and the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (marked
Exhibits 1 and 2) .

A review of these documents indicates hand-

written changes to the May 9, 2003, date-stamp to reflect a date of
May 13, 2003. However, the copy of Order to Show Cause attached to
the Progress/Violation Report (Exhibit 1) has no such hand-written
change. This copy of the Order to Show Cause clearly shows a datestamp of May 9,

2003.

Taking together the documentary evidence

before the Court in light of Mr. Egelund!s credible testimony, the
Court finds that the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit
were filed on May 9, 2003, but that for reasons that the Court need
not delve into, hand-written changes were made to the date-stamp to
reflect

an

apparent

date

that

the

documents

were

docketed.

However, the pivotal date under §77-18-1(11) (b) is not the date of
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docketing, but rather the date of filing.

In this case, this date

is easily determined by Mr. Egelund's testimony that he delivered
these documents to the Court for filing on May 9, 2003, and that he
date-stamped the documents himself with the date of May 9, 2003.
An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the
issuance of an order to show cause.

The documents in this case

reflect that the Court approved and authorized issuance of the
Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003.

Having established the dates

of May 9, 2003, or May 12, 2003, as potential dates for tolling the
defendant's probationary period, the Court now proceeds to evaluate
whether these dates occurred prior to the legislative termination
of the defendant's probation.1
The defendant was placed on probation by this Court on May
12, 2000.

The Court reasons that the first day of probation would

have concluded 24 hours after the sentence was imposed or at the
close of business on the following day, May 13, 2000.

1

Therefore,

During oral argument, the State alluded to a statement made
by the Court at a February 16, 2 0 01, hearing, as providing the
basis for concluding that the Court extended the defendant's
probation at that time. Although the Court indicated at that
hearing that the defendant's probation would not terminate
pending restitution being satisfied, this statement was not
intended as a suggestion that probation was extended or that a
violation in probation had occurred. For these reasons, the
Court does not rely*on the February 16, 2001, date in its
analysis.
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the defendant's probation was set to expire by operation of law on
May 13, 2003, the termination date of the defendant's 3 6-month
probationary period.
Progress/Violation

Accordingly, Mr. Egelund's filing of the

Report

on

May

9,

2003,

and

this

Court's

authorization to issue the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003,
both

occurred

defendant's

prior

to

probation.

the

legislative

The defendant's

termination

of

the

probation period

was

therefore tolled either on May 9, 2003, or at the latest, May 12,
2003.
The tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to its
legislative

termination

sounds

a

death

knell

to

two

of

the

defendant's principal arguments. First, the defendant argues that
under §77-18-10 (a) (ii) (A), this Court can retain jurisdiction over
him* only under the form of a bench probation.

However, this

provision never comes into play because the defendant's probation
did not expire or terminate under §77-18-10(a)(i), but was instead
tolled under §77-18-1(11) (b) .
Second, the defendant argues that the due process concerns of
State v. Call, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 1999), have been violated in this
case because he was not notified of the State's intent to extend
his probation before the expiration of his probation period.

Once

again, the holding in Call is not applicable to these facts because
the

defendant's

probation

did

not

expire,

it

was

tolled.
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Therefore, the service upon the defendant of the Order to Show
Cause on May 19, 2003, was within the probationary period and was
therefore appropriate under due process considerations.
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that it has
jurisdiction
probation

to extend

extension

the defendant's

proceedings

were

probation

initiated

because

prior

to

the
the

legislative termination of the probation period and served to toll
the probation period under §77-18-1(11) (b) . The defendant's Motion
to Dismiss is therefore denied.
Having concluded that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the
defendant's probation period, the Court next considers the issue of
whether the Court can extend the defendant's probation in 3 6-month
intervals

or

for the

full duration of his

remaining

10-year

sentence (two terms not to exceed 5 years, to run consecutively).
The Court's own legal research has not yielded a case or statute
addressing this precise issue. However, distilling the general law
on the trial court's discretion in matters of sentencing and
probation to its essence provides that while the Court has a large
measure of flexibility, it must be exercised "within legislatively
established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988).
Further,

the

Court

can

find

no

express

limitation

on

the

permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together
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with any extensions, not' exceed the legislatively established
sentencing guidelines.
Applying these concepts to this case, the Court concludes that
it has the discretion to extend the. defendant' s probation up to the
remaining term of the Courtfs original sentence (equating to 10
years).

The defendant's

failure

to pay

the

May and June

installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the
defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the
shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over
him.

Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making

restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the
Court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the
defendant's probation for the maximum length permissible, the
remaining full term of his sentence of 10 years.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and extending his
probation in the manner indicated above.
Dated this

.day of^&an&r 2003.

TIMOfHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

